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Oil and Gas Taxation: A Study in Reform
By SANFORD M. GUERIN*
INTRODUCTION
Although all citizens are guaranteed equality under the
law, the exigencies of economic and political realities often
require a certain amount of compromise in the equitable appor-
tionment of the tax burden between respective taxpayers. Be-
cause the tax laws, in addition to their purely revenue-
producing function, are often utilized to regulate and promote
a wide spectrum of economic, social, and political policies, the
laws frequently encourage a conflict between competing policy
considerations. One by-product of this problem has been the
tendency toward increased complexity of the tax laws, with a
proportional increase in difficulty of interpretation and admin-
istration. Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of oil
and gas taxation.
Since the inception of the federal income tax, concerned
taxpayers and legislators have voiced considerable criticism of
the federal tax provisions which promote preferential or special
treatment for certain groups. This criticism has become unde-
niably stronger in recent years. Reform-minded taxpayers have
been most vocal over the existence of loopholes and "tax shel-
ter" provisions that, even when not intending to do so, allow
high income taxpayers to avoid paying their "fair share" of the
tax burden. Responding to this criticism, Congress has enacted
amendments to existing provisions and created new and more
restrictive provisions under the various tax reform acts. The
principal target has been the oil and gas provisions.
While presenting a general overview in oil and gas taxa-
tion, this article will emphasize the relative merits and draw-
backs of recently enacted provisions and trends in the field of
oil and gas taxation. But first, a discussion of the intrinsic
nature of oil and gas is necessary to aid understanding of the
congressional intent underlying the oil and gas tax provisions.
Although sharing a number of the general concepts with
* The author is a professor at the University of Denver College of Law; B.S., 1971,
Boston University; J.D., 1974, University of San Francisco School of Law; L.L.M. in
Taxation, 1975, New York University; Member, California Bar. The author wishes to
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other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Code), oil and gas taxation differs conceptu-
ally in certain key aspects. The reasons for the differences in
concept, with corresponding differences in terminology, can be
reduced to a basic trio of physical, economic, and political
considerations. The fact-that oil and gas deposits are nonre-
newable, are found at often considerable depths beneath the
surface of the earth or ocean floor, and are extractable only
through various exploration, drilling, pumping, and recovery-
enhancement operations constitutes a part of the unique physi-
cal factors inherent in oil and gas activities. The economic
factors include those of burgeoning demand, finite supply, for-
eign oil, inflation, cost effectiveness of recovery techniques, and
alternative energy sources. The political considerations involve
dealing with the problems inherent in attempting to allocate
and regulate a relatively scarce commodity among competing
consumer and producer groups, both internally on the national
level and externally on a global scale.
At present, there appears to be two competing schools of
thought regarding the preferential tax treatment historically
afforded the oil and gas industry. The one school concerned
with the unfair tax advantage designed to benefit the oil and
gas taxpayers contends that certain oil and gas provisions, not
truly serving to promote or stimulate domestic exploration,
create a "tax shelter industry" in themselves. As such, these
provisions are counterproductive to the broad national policy
favoring energy self-sufficiency and efficiency. The opposite
school of thought is entertained by critics who charge that re-
cently, enacted provisions vitiate the national policy favoring
increased incentives for domestic oil and gas exploration. Con-
gress is presently giving with one hand and taking with the
other. These critics contend, for example, that the availability
of the percentage depletion allowance, a major incentive for the
drilling and development of domestic oil and gas deposits,
should have been expanded, not restricted, as was the case in
recent legislation. The tension created by these two divergent
views is no better reflected than in the tax reform provisions
that modify the basic tenets of oil and gas taxation as discussed
in this article.
VOL. 56
OIL AND GAS REFORM
I. INTANGIBLE DRILLING COSTS
A. The Significance of Intangibles
Because intangible drilling costs (hereinafter referred to as
IDC) are a major part of the total cost of an oil and gas venture
and are afforded preferential tax treatment, a thorough under-
standing of IDC is of great importance to those interested in the
taxation of oil and gas. The IDC provisions play a vital role in
the national policy favoring incentives for exploration and de-
velopment of oil and gas reserves by granting the taxpayer the
option of deducting IDC as an expense in the year paid or
incurred rather than capitalizing and recovering these costs,
like other capital expenditures, through depreciation or deple-
tion.'
During the past decade, several factors presented new
challenges of statutory interpretation for the courts and serious
policy and administrative considerations for the Congress in-
volving the deduction of IDC. These factors are as follows: 1)
the insatiable worldwide appetite for oil and gas; 2) the increas-
ing difficulty of locating accessible oil and gas deposits; 3) the
rapidly increasing expense of drilling and developing producing
wells; 4) the advancement of drilling technology; and 5) the
increasing fervor over the tax-sheltering potential of an invest-
ment in an oil and gas venture. Due to the legislative, adminis-
trative, and judicial responses to these considerations, the sub-
ject of IDC has become increasingly complex and controversial.
B. Historical Development of IDC Provisions
The option to deduct IDC was created by an administrative
ruling' incident to the Revenue Act of 1916. The lack of statu-
tory authority and the clearly capital nature of intangible drill-
ing expenditures invited attack.
The first attack occurred in 1931 in the case of Sterling Oil
and Gas Company v. Lucas.3 The district court found that,
although IDC were classified properly as capital expenditures,
the long acceptance and the unmodified reenactment of the
IDC provisions gave the regulation the force and effect of law.4
1. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(b)(1),(2) (1965).
2. Treas. Reg. 45, Article 223.
3. 51 F.2d 413 (W.D. Ky.), aff'd on other grounds, 62 F.2d 951 (6th Cir. 1933).
4. 51 F.2d 413 (W.D. Ky.) at 416.
1979
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Two years later the circuit court reached the same conclusion. "
However, in the second attack in 1945 the court held the
IDC regulations to be invalid in the case of F.H.E. Oil Com-
pany v. Commissioner.' The court reasoned as follows: 1) the
allowance of a deduction for capital expenditures would be
improper under the Code, 2) no specific authority could be
inferred from the depletion provisions in the Code, and 3) the
lack of specific authority could not be cured by a regulation
promulgated without statutory authority and congressional
acquiescence.7 The industry fought back and obtained a resolu-
tion from the 79th Congress8 to indicate previous congressional
recognition of the IDC regulations. Unswayed, the court in
F.H.E. Oil denied a second request for rehearing?
Finally, the matter of deductibility of IDC was codified in
1954 and regulations were authorized to be prescribed." '
Subsection 263(c) created a specific exemption for IDC from
the general rule of subsection 263(a) prohibiting deduction of
capital expenditures.
C. IDC Defined
The regulations define IDC as "expenditures made by an
operator for wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., inci-
dent to and necessary . . . for the production of oil and gas."'"
These expenditures must be incurred in the following three
areas:
1) In the drilling, shooting, and cleaning of wells;
2) In such clearing of ground, draining, road making, surveying,
and geological works as are necessary in preparation for the drill-
ing of wells; and
5. Ramsey v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 316 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 673
(1933).
6. 147 F.2d 1002, 1005, rehearing denied, 149 F.2d 238, second rehearing denied,
150 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1945), aff'g 3 T.C. 13 (1944), nonacq. 1944 C.B. 37, nonacq.
withdrawn and acq. 1960-1 C.B. 4.
7. Id.
8. 59 Stat. 44 (1945).
9. 150 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1945).
10. I.R.C. § 263(c). This subsection provides as follows:
Notwithstanding subsection (a), regulations shall be prescribed by the
Secretary under this subtitle corresponding to the regulations, which
granted the option to deduct as expenses intangible drilling and develop-
ment costs in the case of oil and gas wells and which were recognized and
approved by the Congress in House Concurrent Resolution 50, Seventy-
ninth Congress.
11. Tress. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965).
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3) In the construction of such derricks, tanks, pipelines, and
other physical structures as are necessary for the drilling of wells
and the preparation of wells for the production of oil and gas.
12
The regulations further provide that only those costs in-
curred which have no salvage value can be classified as intangi-
ble. 3 Thus, tangible assets such as equipment, facilities, or
structures which have salvage value do not qualify as IDC
whether or not they are incident to the drilling of wells or in
preparing the wells for production." However, the classifica-
tion of costs such as wages, fuel, repairs, and hauling supplies
connected with tangible assets depends on whether these struc-
tures or equipment are incident to or necessary for the drilling
of wells. If so, these expenditures are deemed to have no salvage
value and would qualify as IDC.
5
The focus of the regulations is upon the drilling and prepa-
ration of wells for production. Since expenditures for recon-
naissance and detailed surveys, commonly known as G and G
costs, represent capital expenditures not incident or necessary
for the drilling of wells, they cannot be deducted as IDC; in-
stead, they must be capitalized and added to the basis of the
property.' Furthermore, the Internal Revenue Service (herein-
after referred to as the Service) considers the drilling and prep-
aration of wells for production as complete when the well casing
and the "christmas tree" are installed. 7 After this point, costs
without salvage value are costs incident to production and are
therefore treated as currently deductible operating expenses,
not IDC.
D. Who May Deduct IDC?
IDC are capital expenditures in nature, but as stated
above, they are specifically exempted from the general rule of
subsection 263(a) forbidding current deduction of capital ex-
penditures. However, there are two prerequisites to IDC de-




15. Id. On the other hand, costs such as wages, fuel, and repairs that are con-
nected with equipment or facilities not incident to the drilling of wells do not qualify
for the IDC option. Tress. Reg. § 1.612-4(c)(1) (1965).
16. Rev. Rul. 77-188, 1977-1 C.B. 76. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
17. See Tress. Reg. § 1.612(c)(2) (1965).
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rather than capitalize, IDC. Second, the election must be
proper.
1. Operator Defined
An "operator," as defined by the regulations, is a party
holding an operating or working interest in the property." The
owner of a working interest assumes the burden of developing
and operating the property. Consequently, the working interest
must bear all costs in connection with finding oil and gas, as
well as those attributable to lifting the oil and gas from the
reservoir. The working interest looks to the production of the
oil and gas to recoup his drilling and operating costs and make
a profit: The working interest may be acquired by purchase,
lease, or any other form of contractual arrangement." The ac-
tual drilling of the well may be done by the operator himself,
a contractor engaged on a per-foot cost basis, or on a turnkey
basis. 20
The operator with a fractionalized working interest is al-
lowed a deduction only for the IDC attributable to his fraction
of the working interest. 21 Additionally, the working interest, or
fraction thereof, must be held throughout the "complete pay-
out period" in order to qualify the interest for the IDC elec-
tion.Y
2. Method and Effect of the Election
The operator electing to deduct the IDC must do so on his
return for the first taxable year in which the costs are paid or
incurred.1 A formal statement is not necessary, but a failure
to deduct the costs in the first year is deemed an election to
capitalize these expenditures. An amended return for the first
taxable year IDC are paid or incurred reflecting the election
will not cure the original return's oversight of capitalizing IDC
unless the amended return is filed before the due date of the
original return.2




22. See Rev. Rul. 71-207, 1971-1 C.B. 160; Rev. Rul. 71-206, 1971-1 C.B. 105; Rev.
Rul. 70-336, 1970-1 C.B. 45; Rev. Rul. 69-332, 1969-2 C.B. 87.
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(d) (1965).
24. Id.
25. Commissioner v. Titus Oil and Inv. Co., 132 F.2d 969, 970 (10th Cir. 1949).
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The effect of the election to either capitalize or deduct
IDC is clear-the election is binding for all subsequent years."
Moreover, costs deducted under the election may not be in-
cluded in the basis of the property for depreciation or depletion
purposes. 7
However, all is not lost where an operator failed to deduct
his IDC in the first taxable year. In the case of nonproductive
wells, the regulations provide the operator a second option:
If the operator has elected to capitalize intangible drilling costs,
then . . . such costs incurred in drilling a nonproductive well
may be deducted by the taxpayer as an ordinary loss provided a
proper election is made in the return for the first taxable year
... in which such well is completed.28
E. Areas of Uncertainty or Controversy
1. Deepening Wells and Secondary Recovery
Although the regulations provide a broad description of
items qualifying as IDC, examination of applicable revenue
rulings and case law reveals certain expenditures which,
though not appearing to be directly connected with drilling and
development for production, can indeed qualify for the IDC
election. For example, an operator may decide to deepen, per-
haps with an eye towards dual completion," a well already
in production at a certain depth. Although the costs of operat-
ing a well are clearly not IDC, the costs for intangible items
connected with the deepening of such a well qualify for IDC
treatment as costs incurred in preparing for production. 30
Secondary recovery expenditures provide another example
of IDC that are not immediately obvious from a reading of
Regulation section 1.612-431 which defines IDC. Frequently,
additional wells will be drilled adjacent to production wells for
the purpose of injecting water, gas, chemicals, steam, or com-
bustible materials, into a reservoir in an effort to repressurize
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(e) (1965).
27. Ramsey v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 316, 379 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S.
673 (1933).
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(b)(4) (1965).
29. Dual completion is a term describing a single well which penetrates two sepa-
rate deposits, one atop the other, both of which are capable of producing commercial
quantities of oil and gas. In practice, production may be limited to one deposit at a
time, or may occur simultaneously upon both.
30. See Moniovia Oil Co., 28 B.T.A. 335, 347 (1933), aff'd on other grounds, 83




the wells to enable further recovery of the oil and gas in place.12
Although these injection wells are not capable of producing oil
and gas themselves, the intangible costs incurred in drilling
them qualify as IDC because they are paid or incurred for the
purpose of enabling the existing wells to resume or increase
production .3 Also, costs for the fracturing of rock or sand struc-
tures surrounding existing wells in production can qualify as
IDC incurred in development for production4.
3
Although it is apparent that those costs incident to drilling
and development of wells qualify for the IDC election, a prob-
lem arises in classifying those costs incurred in connection with
the workover of wells as either IDC or operating expenses.3
5
Regulation section 1.612-4(a)(1),3 1 which provides that the in-
tangible costs incurred in the cleaning of wells qualify as IDC,
implies that IDC are not limited to preproduction expenses.
While one case has held that pulling rods and tubing and clean-
ing out a well constituted operating expenses,37 it may be rea-
sonable to assume that a broader reading of the regulations
might overturn this precedent.
What about workover costs incurred in connection with
the maintenance of production? Although the Service has ruled
that the costs incurred for wells drilled to dispose of salt water
encroaching upon petroleum deposits must be capitalized as
costs related to improvements for operations, 3 one authority
has suggested that a salt water well drilled for the dual purpose
of disposal and injection for pressurization might qualify for
IDC treatment if the principal purpose was repressurizing for
32. This is one of many methods of secondary and tertiary recovery of oil and gas.
33. Rev. Rul. 69-583, 1969-2 C.B. 41; see also Page Oil Co., 41 B.T.A. 952, nonacq.
1940-2 C.B. 13.
34. Producers Chemical Co. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 940 (1968), acq. 1969-1 C.B.
21.
35. The importance of distinguishing IDC from operating expenses remains
whether the operator has opted current deduction or capitalization for intangibles.
Should capitalization be elected, perhaps due to circumstances favoring cost depletion
being taken, the operator is concerned with maximizing his depletable basis. Should
current deduction be elected, the operator must take into account the possibility of
recapture (see text accompanying note 90 infra) and tax preference item treatment for
(see text accompanying note 93 infra) those expenditures qualifying for IDC treatment.
36. (1965).
37. P-M-K Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 360,365 (1931), acq. on this
issue, X1-2 C.B. 8.
38. Rev. Rul. 70-414, 1970-2 C.B. 132.
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production. At present, however, it seems likely that the drill-
ing or development for production versus expenditures incident
to operation concept would remain applicable for determining
IDC qualification.
2. Offshore Drilling
Because of rapid technological growth and obvious adverse
physical limitations, offshore drilling programs have presented
numerous novel tax issues. Perplexing questions have arisen
over classification of costs incident to exploratory drilling oper-
ations, platform construction and hauling, and permanent
platform anchoring and erection. Satisfactory answers may
only be achieved by innovative theories.
The case of Exxon Corporation v. United States'" is a clas-
sic confrontation between the Service and the oil industry over
a new issue emanating from offshore drilling. The primary
issue before the court involved the expenditures to fabricate
and construct drilling platform prior to the time the compo-
nents were lifted from the transport barge at the drill site.
a. The Position of the Service
The Service argued that the construction on land and fab-
rication activities during transportation constituted acquisi-
tion costs that were not subject to the IDC election.' In other
words, these expenditures for construction of the platform be-
fore installment of the structure at the drill site constituted
tangible assets with salvage value so as to preclude current
deductibility as IDC. The Service cited 2 as authority Revenue
Ruling 70-596,11 which was a response to the changing metho-
dologies of offshore drilling. The ruling determined that ex-
penditures relating to
any offshore platform that, although used in connection with
drilling operations, are not incident to or necessary for the drill-
ing of wells, or any platform component necessary for the produc-
tion activity, including service facilities for personnel, incorpo-
rated into the platform structure, or the installation of the pro-
duction equipment . ..
39. R. BOWHAY & F. BURKE, JR., BREEDING & BURTON INcOME TAXATON OF OIL AND
GAS PRODUCTMON, 14.14 (1978).
40. 547 F.2d 548 (Ct. C1. 1976), 77-1 T.C. 1 9114.
41. Id. at 557, 77-1 T.C. 9114, at 86,056.
42. Id. at 549, 77-1 T.C. 9114, at 86.054.
43. 1970-2 C.B. 68.
44. Id. at 69.
1979
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must be capitalized as a depreciable investment. This ruling
concluded that the costs of building platform components on
land did not fall within the purview of subsection 263(c) and,
therefore, represented nondeductible acquisition costs. 5
b. The Position of the Court of Claims
Noting that the primary issue rested on the differing inter-
pretations of the regulations, the court overruled Revenue Rul-
ing 70-596." The court responded to the Service's argument
favoring a limited reading of the IDC provisions by disapprov-
ing of the Service's contention that only those expenditures
incurred in the course of installing constructed property at the
well site were properly deductible as IDC.47 The court, which
refused to sustain an interpretation that excluded from the
option all expenditures relating to construction of physical
property at a place other than the actual well site, stressed the
necessity of such preconstruction on land for the later drilling
and preparation of the well at sea.4s
The court also disapproved of the Service's argument that
the intangible expenditures were so linked to tangible assets as
to have salvage values49 of their own, thereby precluding appli-
cability of subsection 263(c).10 Under this line of reasoning,
total salvage of the entire platform would occur at the moment
the reservoir was reached by the string of oil casing. The court
reasoned that, although only certain costs of drilling and prep-
aration for production are enumerated in Regulation section
1.612-4,11 the Service's conclusion regarding salvage would pre-
clude any cost related to a drill platform from being deductible
for having a salvage value as a production facility.
5 2
Finally, in holding in favor of Exxon, the court supported
its decision on national policy considerations. It stated that the
Service's position was contrary to congressional intention of
45. Id.
46. 547 F.2d 548, 558, (Ct. Cl. 1976), 77-1 T.C. 9114, at 86,062.
47. Id. at 556, 77-1 T.C. 9114, at 86,060.
48. Id. at 553, 77-1 T.C. 9114, at 96,058.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(c) provides that salvage occurs only "upon sale or
other disposition of an asset when it is no longer useful in the taxpayer's trade or
business or in the production of his income and is to be retired from service by the
taxpayer.
50. 547 F.2d 548, (Ct. Cl. 1976), 77-1 T.C. 9114, at 86,060.
51. (1965).
52. 547 F.2d 548, (Ct. Cl. 1976), 77-1 T.C. 9114, at 86,061.
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favoring oil and gas prospecting, and, if followed, would result
in the proliferation of ambiguities and categorization prob-
lems.5
c. The Risk Theory of IDC Classification
Since Exxon represents judicial disapproval of the Ser-
vice's increasingly restrictive position regarding qualification
of expenditures for IDC treatment, it is an extremely signifi-
cant pro-taxpayer case in the IDC series. But the Court of
Claims has created a measure of uncertainty in Exxon. Until
new guidelines are established, the operator seeking to qualify
expenditures as IDC incurred in expanding technologies may
have to resort to broader theoretical considerations behind IDC
provisions.
In an excellent article on IDC and offshore drilling pro-
grams,54 one commentator has documented a growing judicial
trend to examine IDC election qualification as a function of the
level of risk inherent in the IDC activity and the nature of the
taxpayer's interest in the oil and gas property.5 Citing directly
to that article,56 subsequent case law57 has preferred the "risk"
test over the Service's proposed "purpose" (intent to produce)
test.
The "risk" theory is an after-the-fact attempt to provide
a cohesive theoretical framework within which those expendi-
tures which merit IDC treatment may be distinguished from
others. Although "risk" has never been an overt consideration
in the IDC provisions, no other theory appears to be as broadly
applicable and theoretically coherent to determinations involv-
ing IDC qualification. Briefly summarized, the risk test theory
states that economic risk can be equated with the degree of risk
per dollar spent, and comparisons between any two operations
are proper only if their costs are comparable. The term "risk"
is defined as composite of two probability elements: 1) the
funds expended for the operation will fail to obtain an eco-
nomic benefit (from ultimate production); and 2) other prop-
erty or money will be lost because the original expenditure has
53. Id. 558, 77-1 T.C. 9114, at 86,062.
54. Linden, Review of Offshore Drilling - What Are Intangibles? TWENTY-SIXTH
OIL AND GAS INST. 441 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Linden).
55. Id. at 451-52.




led to an economic detriment in excess of the loss of the ex-
penditure itself. 8
Application of the risk test analysis for the purpose of dis-
tinguishing, for example, G and G items from IDC items, yields
a logical and consistent result. Because the survey covers a very
large area to yield information on potential petroleum deposits,
seismic G and G surveys have a relatively low risk factor when
compared to offshore exploratory drilling. As the area of inves-
tigation decreases, the probability of locating oil and gas de-
creases proportionately. Thus, although the same fixed amount
of money might be spent for both a seismic survey and an
exploratory, the latter has a much higher risk factor because
of the greater chance (dollars spent per area investigated) of
failure. Examples of low risk activities requiring capitalization
include lease bonuses, seismic surveys, tangible equipment
acquisition, and production equipment installation. In con-
trast, examples of high risk activities include well drilling and
completing and platform hauling and erecting.
Application of the risk test analysis to property interests
also yields logical and consistent results. The working interest
requirement for the IDC election effectively results in potential
economic benefit for the operation solely from future oil and
gas production. 59 Consequently, the working interest holder
bears the full cost risk of discovering oil and gas in paying
quantities. No discovery results in no recoupment of IDC ex-
penditures. In contrast, nonworking interest holders possess a
noncost-bearing interest in the form of production payments or
royalty rights. They share in production but not in costs or
risks. Moreover, nonworking interests may not exist through-
out the entire payout period" because they are frequently lim-
ited in term or amount.
In conclusion, the Service's position with regard to offshore
drilling activities has been an attempt to limit IDC qualifica-
tion to only those drilling operations in which the operator has
the intent to produce oil and gas. Not only does this "intent to
produce" test create difficult administrative determinations
based upon an operator's intent, the test cannot adequately
58. Linden, supra note 54, at 454.
59. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
60. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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explain why injection wells, dry holes, and exploratory wells
which were not originally intended for production but are later
reentered for production purposes qualify for the IDC election.
Although the Tax Court has recognized the fact that "risk
and IDC are inextricably related,"'" it is premature to state
with certainty that the risk test will be unanimously adopted.
Nevertheless, application of a risk test type of analysis should
prove helpful to operations seeking IDC treatment of novel
expenditures.
F. Geological and Geophysical Exploration Costs as IDC
1. Background
The tax treatment of the costs incurred in the geological
and geophysical exploration 2 for oil and gas projects is a some-
what perplexing topic in the field of oil and gas taxation.
Whereas "hard minerals" enjoy a specific deduction for those
expenses connected with predevelopmental prospecting and
exploration, 3 oil and gas exploration costs do not. Also, al-
though the search for petroleum deposits could perhaps be a-
nalogized to a research or experimental activity, oil and gas
activities are specifically excluded from the R & E deduction
provisions.6 Finally, an examination of the IDC deduction op-
tion provisions reveals that only those geological survey explo-
ration expenses incurred to determine the exact location of the
drill site will qualify for deduction under the section 263(c)
option.e5
How, then, are the preliminary geological and geophysical
costs incurred prior to the selection of the actual drill site to
be treated for tax purposes? The general and long-established
rule is that these costs, not deductible in the year incurred, are
61. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 325, 350 (1977).
62. Geological and geophysical survey expenses represent the expenses incurred
in the exploration for oil and gas deposits for the purpose of "narrowing down" the area
being searched for an eventual drill site location.
A typical exploration program for previously unexplored areas involves at least
two phases: 1) the reconnaissance survey(s) of the project area(s), and 2) one or more
detailed surveys of areas of interest within the layer project area(s). The ultimate
decision to sink a shaft or to acquire to retain the oil-and gas-bearing property is often
dependent upon the results of the reconnaissance and detailed surveys. The group
providing and generating the survey information may be an independent contractor
rather than a group already existing in the development organization.
63. I.R.C. § 617(a).
64. I.R.C. § 174(d).
65. See Tress. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1975).
1979
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to be capitalized and recovered over the producing life of the
well.6 Obviously contrary to the interests of taxpayers con-
cerned with maximizing current deductions in an oil and gas
venture, such treatment, however, may be subject to judicial
change.
2. The Proper Classification of G and G Costs
The law is not specific in its differentiation of G and G
costs from IDC; a reading of only the Code and regulations
would lead one to assume that these costs may be one in the
same. For example, there is no Code section dealing specifically
with preproduction oil and gas expenses other than section
263(c), which exempts IDC from the general rule disallowing a
current deduction for capital expenditures. Further, the regula-
tions lists as an example of IDC as expenditures for "clearing
or ground, draining, road making, surveying, and geological
works as are necessary in preparation for the drilling of wells
. . ,"7 Arguably, it would be reasonable to assume that these
expenditures concerning surveying and geological works as
being "necessary" for the preparation of wells, should include
the entirety of the reconnaissance and detailed survey costs
that are initiated to determine the location of the most advan-
tageous drill site. Such is not the case; the Service has charac-
terized these surveys as being capital expenditures incurred
"for the purpose of obtaining and accumulating data which will
serve as a basis for the acquisition or retention of property.""
By characterizing G and G costs as capital expenditures made
in connection with the acquisition or preservation of property,
the Service has attempted to remove them from consideration
as IDC, which, of course, are subject to the option for current
deduction.
One question which arises at this point concerns the possi-
ble characterization of G and G costs as ordinary and necessary
business expenses. 9 Certainly, a taxpayer in the business of
producing oil and gas will find it necessary to search for that
upon which his operations depend; until a successful search is
66. Rev. Rul. 77-188, 1977-1 C.B. 76.
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a)(2) (1965) (emphasis added).
68. Rev. Rul. 77-188, 1977-1 C.B. 76.
69. Hall, Geological and Geophysical Costs, SIXTEENTH OnL AND GAs INsT. 584
(1965). The author suggests that prior to 1938 tax-payees routinely deducted G and G
costs as ordinary and necessary business expenses pursuant to Code section 162.
VOL. 56
OIL AND GAS REFORM
made, he cannot undertake production. The main reason G
and G costs are capital expenditures, rather than ordinary and
necessary business expenses, is because the Service has so
ruled.1
The Service's present position on the nondeductibility of
G and G costs can be found in Revenue Ruling 77-188. 1' The
holdings of this ruling can be summarized briefly as follows:
1. Property acquired or retained upon the basis of information
from G and G survey and exploration has its adjusted basis in-
creased by the amount of G and G cost;
2. Oil and gas exploration programs are conducted on the basis
of project areas, with separate project areas being deemed to exist
if they are noncontiguous to one another. Reconnaissance surveys
are typically made of each project area, and areas of interest
subject to detailed surveys are revealed by the larger reconnais-
sance surveys. If no preliminary reconnaissance survey is made,
the project area and area of interest are deemed to be coexten-
sive. If more than one noncontiguous area of interest is found,
each area of interest is independent of the other.
3. The G and G costs, generally capitalized entirely to the area
of interest found, is apportioned equally, without regard to
acreage of actual proportional cost, between the areas of interest
if more than one exists within the project area.
4. The G and G costs are deductible as a loss under section 165
only where no area of interest is located within a project area.
5. An exception to the above rules exists where a property
within, adjacent to, or nearby an area of interest is acquired;
here, a portion of the reconnaissance survey attributable to the
area of interest, as well as the entire cost of the detailed survey
of the area of interest, is apportioned to the property acquired. If
more than one property within, adjacent to, or nearby, the area
of interest is acquired, the G and G costs are capitalized and
apportioned between them on a per acreage basis.
This revenue ruling cites a series of cases" beginning in
1928 in support of the Service's position. However, close exami-
nation of these cases reveals that the Service's position, not
supported by sound judicial reasoning and interpretation, re-
70. Rev. Rul. 77-188, 1977-1 C.B. 76, at 77.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The cases cited are: Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Commissioner,
7 T.C. 507 (1946), aff'd on other issues, 161 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1947); Schermerhorn
Oil Corporation v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 151 (1952); G.E. Cotton v. Commissioner,
25 B.T.A. 866 (1932); C.M. Nusbaum v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 664 (1928); and
Seletha 0. Thompson v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 1342 (1928).
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sults by virtue of certain somewhat dubious interpretations
which have, through long usage, attained the effect of law.
Notwithstanding the lack of sound judicial reasoning and
interpretation, the fact that development and exploration costs
for natural resources, particularly G and G costs for oil and gas,
are capital expenditures cannot be denied. Although the line
of cases relied upon by the Service can be questioned as to
soundness and validity, it seems likely that these long standing
positions by the Service and courts would be virtually impossi-
ble to overcome. Akin to leasehold improvements that are ben-
eficial over the term of the lease, G and G costs are undeniably
capital expenditures.
However, in light of the fact that Congress has made a
substantial concession for IDC with section 263(c), the fact
that G and G costs are properly characterized and treated as
capital expenditures should not automatically preclude their
current deductibility. Certainly, those IDC expenditures quali-
fying for the section 263(c) election are also capital expendi-
tures since they benefit production over the term of the prop-
erty interest. Isn't it possible that certain G and G costs would
be recharacterized as IDC items? The answer, at present, ap-
pears to be in the affirmative, at least to certain costs of devel-
opment of offshore drilling projects.
3. Exploratory Drilling
Offshore drilling projects involve large areas of the ocean
floor which must be explored and prospected at considerable
expense 4 to determine the possibilities of locating petroleum
deposits in quantities sufficient for commercial exploration.
74. In contrast to land-based explorations, offshore explorations are subject to
additional contraints which serve to "up the ante" for G and G exploration. For
example, because of environmental considerations, these G and G exploration activi-
ties, (involving exploratory surveying and drilling by the use of seismic boats, jack up
rigs, submersibles, drilling vessels, and ice islands), have come under increasing gov-
ernmental administrative agency review and regulation. A partial list of those bodies
having licensing and regulatory powers are: the Department of the Interior, United
States Geological Survey, Environmental Protection Agency, Corps of Engineers
(Army), Coast Guard, Council on Environmental Quality, various state coastal zone
management commissions, and other state environmental regulatory agencies. Among
the applicable laws and acts are: the Outer-Continental Shelf Lands Act, the National
Environmental Policy Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972
(as amended), the River and Harbor Act of 1899, the Coastal Zone Management Act
of 1972, and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act.
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The accumulated data from surveys of project areas serves as
a basis for abandonment or further detailed survey of any areas
of interest. However, since G and G data resulting from under-
sea surveying is more limited than data resulting from land-
based exploration, greater reliance is placed on the results of
exploratory wells for the purpose of determining the location of
permanent production wells and facilities. Because of the ex-
tremely high costs of undersea drilling, a common practice is
to install casings and fixtures suitable for production before it
is known whether petroleum deposits will be of production
quality and quantity. In the event a suitable deposit is discov-
ered, other wells must be drilled to determine the boundaries
of the deposit and the placement of production wells.
Because of the uncertainties inherent in exploratory drill-
ing, the Service has maintained that exploratory drilling costs
are to be capitalized and cannot qualify for IDC treatment.75
Appearing contrary to the regulations,7" the Service's position
was attacked in the recent Tax Court case of Standard Oil
(Indiana) v. Commissioner." In Standard Oil, the petitioner
drilled twenty-one wells from mobile platforms between 1967
and 1979. Four of the wells were drilled in the offshore waters
of Louisiana, nine wells were drilled in the United Kingdom
portion of the North Sea, and eight wells were drilled off the
coast of Trinidad. All of the wells drilled, except for two off the
coast of Trinidad, found deposits of petroleum in producing
quantities. Pursuant to subsection 263(c), Standard Oil
claimed as current deductions the drilling costs of the success-
ful exploratory wells.
The Service determined deficiencies of over $48,000,000
claiming that the drilling costs represented nondeductible G
and G capital expenditures. In support of its position, the Serv-
ice contended that Standard Oil had not met the burden of
proof with respect to qualifying the well expenditures as IDC.78
The Service maintained that the wells were an extension of
exploratory work, and therefore, they could not be considered
as incident to development for production until the decision to
install a permanent drilling platform had been made.79
75. Rev. Rul. 70-596, 1970-2 C.B. 68.
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (1965).
77. 68 T.C. 325 (1977).
78. Id. at 343.
79. Id. at 345.
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The Tax Court made several observations before discuss-
ing the primary issue. First, under F.H.E. Oil Company v.
Commissioner,N the court stated that all expenses incurred in
drilling the wells were capital expenditures under subsection
263(a) and therefore, cases dealing with the question of charac-
terization of expenses as capital expenditures were inapplica-
ble.8 Second, the fact that the wells provided G and G data did
not preclude the deduction of drilling costs as IDC. 2 Third, and
perhaps equally important, the court stated that "Congress
favors a liberal interpretation of the IDC regulation." Finally,
the court, holding that the mere classification of the wells as
being "exploratory" did not preclude them from being a part
of the "development" of the properties for production, stated
"the dividing line between exploratory work which must be
capitalized and development activities coming within the IDC
option is the point at which the preparations for drilling
begin."" The court, finding no express or implied limits in the
regulations stating that the only wells drilled after the decision
to install a permanent drilling platform could qualify for IDC
treatment, held in favor of the taxpayer. It noted that the
Service's theory on IDC qualification would result in the disal-
lowance of not only all "wildcat" wells, but also those wells
which were drilled from mobile drilling rigs and later reentered
from a fixed platform.85 The Service's "decision to install a
permanent drilling platform"8 test, found by the court to be
akin to an "intent to produce" test, was invalidated-
application of this test would disallow drilling costs clearly
within the ambit of section 1.612-4 of the regulations." The
court concluded by holding that the proper method to restrict
the IDC provisions lay in amending legislation, not judicial
restriction."
In conclusion, the primary importance of the Standard Oil
80. 147 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1945).
81. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 325, 344 (1977).
82. Id. at 345.
83. Id.






OIL AND GAS REFORM
case lies in its presentation of the first coherent and well-
reasoned analysis distinguishing IDC from G and G costs. Rest-
ing solely on the facts of the instant case, the decision as to
deductibility of certain offshore exploratory drilling expenses
will also be applicable to future situations involving neoteric
systems and technologies. However, to claim that the Standard
Oil case has effectively converted certain G and G costs into
IDC would be erroneous; it merely allows more expenditures to
be properly characterized by clarifying the distinctions be-
tween IDC and G and G costs.
G. Tax Reform Reduces IDC Benefits
While the Service has endeavored to restrict IDC treat-
ment for expenditures through their strained interpretation of
the statutes and regulations, Congress has pursued a direct
approach to minimize the favorable tax effects of IDC treat-
ment.
1. Recapture of IDC
Aimed at limiting the conversion of ordinary income into
capital gain, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 added section 1254
to the Code. This provision, a progeny of section 1245 and
12509 recapture provisions, requires gains from the disposition
of oil and gas properties, heretofore treated as capital gain, to
be recaptured as ordinary income to the extent of the IDC
deductions taken after December 31, 1975. This recaptured
amount 0 is to be reduced by the amount that would have been
deducted had the IDC been capitalized. In short, upon the
disposition of an oil or gas property the operator now realizes
ordinary income to the extent that his deductions for IDC ex-
89. Section 1245 prescribes recaptare of capital gain into ordinary income where
the gain is attributable to depreciation deductions claimed on the tangible personal
property sold. Section 1250 prescribes recapture of capital gain into ordinary income
where the gain is attributable to depreciation deductions claimed in excess of straight
line depreciation on the real property sold.
90. Special rules are provided for determining the amount recaptured as ordinary
income where a taxpayer sells a portion of, or an individual interest in, an oil or gas
property. First, in the case of a disposition of a portion of an oil or gas property other
than an undivided interest, Section 1254(a)(2) provides that the entire amount of the
aggregate IDC that have been deducted after December 31, 1975 is allocated to the
portion of the property disposed of first. Any excess of IDC that are not recaptured in
the first disposition of a portion of the property is to be subsequently allocated to the
remaining portion of the property. Such a situation obviously occurs when the IDC
exceed the total amount of gain realized. Second, if an "undivided interest in an oil
or gas property, or a portion thereof, is disposed of, Section 1254(a)(2) provides that a
proportionate part of the IDC attributable to that property is to be allocated to the
undivided interest to the extent of the gain."
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ceed the amount that would have been allowed had the IDC
been capitalized, not deducted, and recovered over the life of
the property. However, the recaptured amount cannot exceed
the gain realized on the sale of the property.91
An example is in order to illustrate the effects and me-
chanics of section 1254. On July 1, 1978, an investor purchases
for $30,000 the mineral estate which contains potential oil and
gas deposits. The investor becomes an operator and incurs
$25,000 in IDC which he deducts on his 1978 return. Without
the election to deduct IDC currently, the operator would have
deducted $5,000 through cost depletion. After discovering oil,
the operator holds the property interest for over 12 months
92
and sells his working interest in the mineral estate for $100,000
on August 1, 1979. Before enactment of section 1254, the opera-
tor would have a capital gain computed as follows:
Sales Price $100,000
Less Basis 30,000
Capital Gain $ 70,000
After enactment of section 1254, the capital gain is recap-
tured as ordinary income to the extent IDC were deducted in
excess of the amount that would have been deducted had the
IDC been capitalized and recovered through cost depletion.
The capital gain and ordinary income is computed as follows:
Gain Realized $70,000
IDCs Deducted $25,000
Cost Depletion Deduction 5,000
Ordinary Income $20,000
Difference is Capital Gain $50,000
As can be readily seen, the new provision converts $20,000
of capital gain into ordinary income.
2. IDC as a Tax Preference Item
By adding "excess" IDC to the list of tax preference
items,93 the Tax Reform Act of 1976 further watered down in-
91. I.R.C. § 1254 (a)(1)(B).
92. By holding the property over 12 months, the owner satisfies section 1222(c)
which defines the holding period required before capital gain treatment is allowed.
93. Code section 57 delineates 11 items of tax preference: 1) excess itemized de-
ductions; 2) accelerated depreciation of real property; 3) accelerated depreciation on
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centives once present in the tax-deferring IDC election. Newly-
enacted paragraph 57(a)(11) serves to penalize certain opera-
tors" by classifying a portion of IDC deducted currently as a
tax preference item.
For tax years beginning after 1977, the tax preference por-
tion of the IDC deduction is equal to the actual IDC deduction
minus the amount which would have been deductible had the
IDC been capitalized and recovered via straight line recovery
of intangibles." The phrase "straight line recovery of intangi-
bles" is defined by subsection 57(d) as the greater of:
1. ratable amortization of such costs over the 120-month period
beginning with the month in which production from such well
begins; or
2. any method which would be permitted for purposes of deter-
mining cost depletion with respect to such well.
This new tax preference rule does not apply in two cases.
The first case occurs where the operator elects to capitalize,
rather than deduct, IDC. The second case occurs where the well
is nonproductive."
An example of the mechanics of this new provision is ap-
propriate. An operator incurs $48,000 in IDC in November and
December of 1978. The amount of the IDC tax preference item
for 1978 will be $48,000 minus the straight line recovery of
intangibles of $800 computed as follows:
2 months
$48,000 times o = $800120 months
The additional tax liability would be $7,080 computed by
multiplying $47,200 (IDC net of straight line recovery intangi-
bles) by 15% minimum tax rate. 7
leased personal property; 4) amortization of certified pollution control facilities; 5)
amortization of railroad rolling stock; 6) stock options; 7) reserves for losses on bad
debts of financial institutions; 8) depletion (see text accompanying note 221 infra); 9)
capital gains; 10) amortization of on-the-job training and child care facilities; and 11)
intangible drilling costs.
94. Code section 57(a)(11) excludes corporations as an operator who must treat
IDC as a tax preference item.
95. I.R.C. § 57(a)(11).
96. Id.
97. Section 56(a) provides that the minimum tax is equal to 15% of the amount
by which the sum of the tax preference items exceeds the greater of (1) $10,000 or (2)
one-half of the taxpayer's regular tax. After 1978, this 15% add-on tax will no longer
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II. THE AT RISK LIMITATIONS
Tax shelter investments, including those involving oil and
gas, typically involve one or more of the following elements: 1)
deferral of tax; 2) conversion of ordinary income into capital
gain; and 3) leverage of investment power through use of bor-
rowed funds. In the case of oil and gas, two of these common
elements, deferral and conversion, have been limited by enact-
ment of previously discussed provisions: one classifying certain
IDC as tax preference items and the other creating a recapture
of IDC. Leveraging, the third common element, has been re-
stricted by the enactment of section 465, the at risk limitation
provision.
A. The Basic Problem-Tax Deductible Losses
This provision was enacted in response to the executive
and legislative branches' growing preoccupation with the polit-
ically expedient issue of tax reform, particularly in regard to
tax shelter activities. In 1973 the Secretary of the Treasury,
George Shulz, observed, "[Tiaxpayers who have large in-
comes and pay little or no tax do exist in limited, but signifi-
cant numbers,""8 and "[pireoccupation with tax manipula-
tions-particularly tax deductible 'losses'-too often obscures
the economic realities and can have the effect of discouraging
profitable and efficient enterprise.""
How are these tax deductible losses created? The answer
is simple-leveraging. The role of leveraging in creating these
tax deductible losses has been succintly described as follows:
Without borrowing one can only defer recognition of an amount
of gain not greater than his investment. But by borrowing he can
make his gross investment exceed his net investment, and the
amount he can defer, while limited to his gross investment, may
exceed his net investment several times over. Thus it is that
investors in tax shelters may not only deduct their whole invest-
ment, but actually get it back in the form of tax savings within
a short period, and still go on to shelter more income. The tax
apply to the capital gains or the excess itemized deductions preference items. Instead,
these two items become part of the new alternative minimum tax which becomes
effective in 1979. This new alternative tax will apply only if it produces a tax that is
higher than the individual's regular tax liability as increased by the add-on minimum
tax. See section 55 of the Internal Revenue Code enacted into law by section 421 of
the Revenue Act of 1978.
98. Hearings on General Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 6877 (1973).
99. Id. at 6878 (emphasis added).
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cost is a so-called phantom gain to be recognized some years
hence."
The advantages in leveraging are even more apparent
when the borrowing is on a nonrecourse basis. The lack of per-
sonal liability for repayment is particularly attractive when the
nonrecourse loan proceeds can be used to increase the gross
investment amount, and thereby increase the sheltered activ-
ity's potential for sheltering other income.
The following oil and gas tax shelter arrangement was not
atypical before the Tax Reform Act of 1976. A drilling corpora-
tion would obtain an oil and gas lease. In order to obtain fi-
nancing to develop the lease, the corporation would sell limited
partnership interests to investors and obtain a loan from a




Corporation - general partner 20 %
A - limited partner 20%
B - limited partner 20%
C - limited partner 20%
D - limited partner 20%
100 %/(
If the required financing is $1,000,000 and each partner
contributes $20,000, then the bank loan must equal $900,000.
Each limited partner's adjusted basis for determining the ex-
tent he can deduct partnership tax shelter losses was $200,000
($20,000 contributed plus $180,000 share of the loan). If the
general partner incurs $500,000 in IDC expense in the first year,
each limited partner's deductible loss would be $100,000 or
one-fifth of the partnerships losses notwithstanding the fact
that as limited partners, they were not personally liable on the
loan. If the partner is in a 50% bracket, the $100,000 deduction
represents a tax savings of $50,000; while the most the partner
can lose is $20,000, his initial contribution. Understandably,
the Service had long been galled by the taxpayer's ability to
100. Lee & Fogg, Secs 465 and 704(d): Invest at Your Own Risk, TAx ADvisOR
8:132 (1977) at 133.
1979
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
include the full amount of nonrecourse liability in his deprecia-
ble basis or his adjusted partnership's basis. "
2. Limitation of Tax Deductible Losses
Congress reacted to the problem of nonrecourse financing
and artificial tax losses by designing section 465. Enacted in
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, this provision served to limit the
taxpayer's allowable loss deductions 02 to the amount of the
taxpayer's investment which is "at risk" at the close of the
taxable year. Oil and gas exploration was one of four activities
subject to the "at risk" limitation. 10 3 However, with the Reve-
nue Act of 1978 Congress amended section 465 to include all
activities except real property investing'"4 and equipment leas-
ing by closely-held corporations. 05
Applying section 465 to the example of the limited partner
creating a $100,000 IDC tax loss with a $20,000 contribution,
the partner's loss is limited to the amount he has "at risk."
Since he can only lose $20,000, he can only deduct $20,000. The
$80,000 balance may be deducted in succeeding years to the
extent he has "at risk" capital. 06
Obviously crucial to the workings of this new provision, the
definition of "at risk" is not as simple as one might hope. For
example, although it is clear that taxpayers are considered to
be "at risk" to the extent of cash and the adjusted basis of their
property contributed to the activity, 07 borrowings that are in-
vested will not be considered "at risk" if they are nonre-
course, 0 8 or are protected through "stop-loss" or other liability-
limiting arrangements.0 9 Furthermore, amounts borrowed
from a person holding an interest in the activity other than a
101. See, e.g., Boger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973); Mayerson v. Commis-
sioner, 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq. 1969-1 C.B. 21.
102. Section 465(d) provides that in computing the loss from an activity, loss is
defined as the deductions allowable for the taxable year determined without regard to
section 465, in excess of the income received or accrued by the taxpayer from the
property.
103. I.R.C. § 465(c)(1)(D). The other three activities were: 1) holding, producing,
or distributing motion picture films; 2) farming; and 3) leasing any section 1245 prop-
erty.
104. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D)(i).
105. Id. § 465 (c)(3)(D)(ii).
106. Id. § 465(d).
107. Id. § 465(b)(1)(A).
108. Id. § 465(b)(1)(B)(4).
109. Id.
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creditor,"0 amounts borrowed from a related party as defined
by section 267(b), and amounts borrowed secured by property
used in the activity also will not be considered to be "at risk."" 2
Enacted in the Revenue Act of 1978, subsection 465(e)
plugged a loophole generated by section 465 as enacted by the
Tax Reform Act of 1976. Under section 465 as originally en-
acted, the taxpayer was only required to be at risk at the end
of the taxable year for which losses were claimed."3 Conse-
quently, subsequent withdrawals of amounts originally placed
at risk could be made without recapture of previously allowed
losses. Therefore, subsection 465(e) requires the recapture of
previously allowed losses when the amount at risk is reduced
below zero."'
III. THE DEPLETION ALLOWANCE
In the field of oil and gas taxation, the emotionalism en-
gendered by issues of the IDC deduction and the loss limitaton
is only exceeded by the issue of the depletion allowance. The
balance of this article will explore the definition and types of
economic interests, the computation and theory of cost and
statutory depletion, and the legislative restriction on the
amount and availability of statutory depletion.
A. Introduction To Depletion
Oil and gas deposits constitute a form of nonrenewable
wasting asset of finite supply. By diminishing the quantity that
may be recovered, the removal of oil and gas from the reservoir
constitutes a "physical" depletion of the deposit. Since the
value of the oil and gas deposit diminishes proportionately with
the physical depletion, "economic" depletion, described in
terms of diminution in value, can be said to go hand-in-hand
with physical depletion.
110. Id. § 465(b)(3)(A).
111. Id. § 465(b)(3)(B).
112. Id. § 465(b)(2)(B).
113. Id. § 465(a).
114. Id. § 465(e)(1). The House Ways and Means Committee Report states: Me-
chanically, this rule works by providing that if the amount at risk is reduced below
zero (by distributions to the taxpayer, by changes in the status of indebtedness from
recourse to nonrecourse, by the commencement of a guarantee or other similar arrange-
ment which affects the taxpayer's risk of loss, or otherwise), the taxpayer will recognize
income to the extent that his at risk basis is reduced below zero. However, the amount
recaptured is limited to the excess of the losses previously allowed in that activity over
any amounts previously recaptured.
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However, for tax purposes the term depletion is used to
describe a somewhat different concept of diminution than is set
forth above. Whereas the "physical" and "economic" depletion
concepts are linked to the number (and value) of the units
produced from the deposit, the tax depletion provisions ' 5 are
based on "income derived from production" concept. This con-
cept of income from production, which is vital to a proper
understanding of the theory and application of depletion for oil
and gas, produces annual depletion deductions which serve to
allocate a portion of the cost of the asset to the gross income
generated by the asset during the tax year.
The theory of depletion also includes a "return of capital"
concept. Because a portion of the production of oil and gas
represents a return of the original capital investment, deduc-
tion in the form of a depletion deduction is allowed as a recov-
ery of the cost of the mineral deposit as the extracted mineral
is sold.
Treasury regulations provide that income from production
of oil and gas results from the sale of the units (barrels or cubic
feet) produced."' Due to the connection between depletion and
income as opposed to production, only those units produced
which are actually sold can qualify for the depletion deduction.
Thus, units consumed in the operation of the property,"7 or
somehow destroyed prior to sale,"8 cannot qualify for the deple-
tion allowance.
B. Economic Interests
Since only those persons possessing an "economic inter-
est" in the mineral in place are entitled to the oil and gas
depletion allowance, and because not all possessory interests in
the oil and gas property qualify as "economic interest," the
definition of an economic interest should be of vital concern to
all oil and gas taxpayers.
1. Economic Interest Defined
Not defined specifically in the Code, the term "economic
115. I.R.C. § 611-13.
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a).
117. Roundup Coal Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 388 (1973) acq. and
nonacq. on other issues, 1954-1 C.B. 6, 8.
118. Pioneer Cooperage Co. v. Commissioner, 53 F.2d 43 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 686 (1931).
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interest" is a creation of case law"' that was adopted by the
Treasury in Regulation 1.611-1(b)(1). 20 This regulation pro-
vides that an economic interest is acquired when "the taxpayer
has acquired by investment any interest in mineral in place
. . .and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income de-
rived from the extraction of the mineral. . . to which he must
look for a return of his capital."'' 2' The regulation further pro-
vides that "[a] person who has no capital investment . . .
does not possess an economic interest merely because through
a contractual relation he possesses a mere economic or pecuni-
ary advantage from production.'2
This regulation and subsequent case law make it clear that
economic interest exists only where there has been a capital
investment in mineral in place and the right to income exists
as a recovery of capital from extraction and production of the
mineral. The capital investment need not, however, be a direct
investment in the sense of "dollars for minerals in place"; it is
possible to acquire an economic interest by making an indis-
pensable contribution in a form other than cash.'
'23
The critical distinction in determining the existence of a
capital investment is the connection between the investment
and the minerals in place. As long as the investment is neces-
sary for the extraction of the mineral, the capital investment
element should be satisfied. The "right to income from produc-
tion" element requires that the taxpayer's right to receive in-
come is dependent solely upon the extraction and production
of the mineral. Again, the critical factor is the absolute
relationship of the right to receive income with the mineral
deposit. In Anderson v. Helvering, '1' the Supreme Court held
that the right to receive oil payments out of both production
and proceeds from the sale of land did not constitute an eco-
nomic interest because the right to receive income was not
solely upon production.12
119. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1932).
120. (1960).
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (1960).
122. Id.
123. Burton-Sutton Oil Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946).
124. 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
125. In Anderson, the Oklahoma City Co. (O.C.C.) owned fee title, royalty
interests, and oil payment rights in certain oil producing properties. It sold everything
to Prichard for $160,000 payable $50,000 in cash, and $110,000 from 50% of the oil
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In summary, the income from an economic interest may be
measured by a share of the mineral extracted, the gross sales
price of the mineral, or the net profits realized from the extrac-
tion of the mineral, so long as there is no obligation to pay from
any source other than the production of the mineral. However,
if payment is made regardless of extraction, or is in any form
guaranteed, the income is not income with respect to an eco-
nomic interest even though it is actually received from the
production of the mineral.
2. Basic Types of Economic Interests
The four basic types of interests in oil and gas properties
that qualify as economic interests are the following: working
interests, 2 royalty rights,' net profits interest,'28 and all pre-
produced from the land or, if the land was sold by Prichard, the proceeds of the sale
were to be applied by Prichard to satisfy the balance remaining on the production
payment. The Supreme Court held that O.C.C.'s $110,000 "production payment" did
not qualify as an "economic interest" in the oil in place. The Court held that although
payment might be and, in fact, was satisfied from oil production, it also could have
been satisfied from the proceeds of the sale of real property. As a result of the Court's
holding, Prichard was required to include in his income the 50% he paid to O.C.C.,
O.C.C. was not entitled to a depletion deduction on the amounts received, and O.CC.
was required to report as a capital gain any amounts received in excess of its basis in
the production.
126. The term "operating interest" is defined by Regs. 1.614-2(b) as "a separate
mineral interest as described in section 615(a), in respect of which the costs of produc-
tion are required to be taken into account by the taxpayer .... " Because the person
holding this interest is the one who physically operates the extraction and production
process, a working interest is separate and distinct from royalty, production type
interests, and net profits interests. The other three types of economic interest are
"nonoperating" interests in the sense that the holders of those interest do not partici-
pate in the production process, but merely receive income from the operations. In
connection with the concept of a working interest to IDC, see text accompanying note
19 supra.
127. A "royalty interest" entitles its holder to a share of the gross production of
the gas and oil from a specific property. The share in production typically lasts as long
as the property interest to which it applies continues to produce. However, in certain
circumstances, it may be limited by local law or be payable at a variable rate or at a
minimum or accelerated rate. A nonproductive royalty, a royalty which applies to a
property not in production, will lapse at the end of a stated term. However, a royalty
interest that is, upon creation, limited to a certain term will continue to exist beyond
the stated term as long as production of the oil and gas actually continues. In this
circumstance, this so called "term royalty" might be more accurately described as a
form of production payment.
128. A "net profits interest" can be briefly described as the right to receive a
specified share of the net profits from production. The method for computation of "net
profit" is not specified statutorily (by the Code or regulation); however, the contract
creating this interest will usually specify those costs and expenditures to be deducted
from gross income to arrive at the net profits figure. Again, a net profits interest,
considered to be a nonoperating interest, is one which lasts throughout the period of
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1969 and certain post-1969 production payments.' 9 Is there a
reason for the conspicuous absence of the "fee interest" in the
list of basic economic interests? Yes, the fact that an individual
holds fee title to land does not automatically mean that he has
any interest in the minerals beneath its surface. Clearly, it is
possible to acquire title to land which has had its mineral rights
severed and conveyed by a prior owner. In addition, it is possi-
ble to hold title to land as a form of security device. In this case,
the titleholder has no economic interest in the minerals in
place. 30 Finally, even in those situations where the fee interest
holder does hold title to the mineral rights, he does not neces-
sarily possess an economic interest in the minerals in place
because economic interest exists upon the production of the
mineral deposit. The mere holding of a mineral rights interest,
without taking any other action does not qualify as an
"economic interest."
B. Production Payments
A common method of obtaining the additional capital or
equipment necessary to bring a property to the producing stage
is to agree to share the mineral in place upon production. Con-
sequently, the taxpayer may either retain an interest in pro-
duction or transfer an interest in production to the party who
assists in the development of the property. Such a transferred
interest is commonly known as a "production payment."
Defined by Regulation 1.636-3(a)(1),' 3' the term produc-
tion payment is a right to receive a specified share of the pro-
duction from a mineral property which is limited by any of the
following: 1) dollar value, 2) amount of oil and gas produced,
or 3) a specified length of time. In order to qualify as a produc-
tion payment, the interest must have an economic life of
shorter duration than of the mineral property to which it ap-
plies.
Production payments may be created in either of two
ways. First, they may be created by one who sells the working
interest in the mineral property and reserves a production pay-
ment for himself. This type is called a retained production
production. As with the "term royalty", a "term net profits interest" might be con-
strued as a form of a production payment.
129. See text accompanying note 131 supra.
130. Gap Anthracite Co. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 924, 931, (1972)




payment. Second, they may be created by one who keeps his
working interest in the mineral property and creates or "carves-
out" a production payment which he sells to a third party. By
virtue of section 636, a provision enacted in the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, retained production payments may be treated as pur-
chase mortgage and carved out production payments may be
treated as mortgages loans. As will be shown hereinafter, the
enactment of section 636 caused these preproduction payments
to lose their status as "economic interests." Thus, the section
substantially impairs the tax planning devices once available
through the use of production payments. The most notable is
the device of the ABC transaction.
32
1. Retained Production Payment
Under law prior to the enactment of section 636, during the
payout period, the holder of the retained production payment
possessed an economic interest in the property. Accordingly,
the income from production paid to the holder of the produc-
tion payment in satisfaction of the obligation was interpreted
to be depletable income in the hands of the holder of the pro-
duction payment and excludable from the gross income of the
operator.
For example, assume that in 1967, A, owning a producing
oil property in which he had an adjusted basis of $10,000, sells
his property to B for $15,000 cash plus the retention by A of a
$100,000 production payment, payable from 50% of the oil pro-
duced and bearing interest at 5% per annum on the unpaid
balance. Since the $100,000 production payment is not consid-
ered when computing A's gain on the sale, A will have a $5,000
taxable gain ($15,000 cash less $10,000 basis) that is subject to
depletion. B will now have a basis in the property of $15,000,
the amount of cash conveyed to A. In 1968 the property pro-
duces $50,000 of oil. Abiding by the contract, B pays $25,000
to A and includes in income the balance of the $50,000 of oil.
The $25,000 paid to A is allocated as follows: $2,500 to interest
on the production payment, and $22,500 to reduce the principal
of the production payment to $77,500 (the $100,000 retained
production payment less the $22,500 principal payment).
Now, assume this sale transpired in 1970 or later years. 33
132. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
133. Treasury regulation section 1.636-4(a) provides that section 636 applies to
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Section 636 prescribes that a retained production payment on
the sale of the mineral property is to be treated as if it were a
purchase money mortgage and, contrary to prior law, it does
not qualify as an economic interest to its holder. Consequently,
A realizes a gain of $105,000 (the sales price of $100,000 re-
tained production payment and the $15,000 cash less A's
$20,000 basis in the property). On the other hand, the income
from production used to satisfy the obligation supported by the
production payment is depletable ordinary income in the
hands of the owner of the working interest. Consequently, B,
as the new owner of a working interest in the mineral property
purchased from A includes in gross income the total $50,000 of
oil production and 100% of production income in subsequent
years. The $25,000 payment to B represents merely a payment
on the purchase money mortgage and has no tax effect on either
A or B. B has a basis of $115,000 in the property (the $100,000
"purchase money mortgage" plus the $15,000 cash).
2. The ABC Transaction
The ABC transaction differs from the normal retained pro-
duction payment in only one aspect; after selling the working
interest, the initial owner of the property sells the retained
production. In the ABC transaction, A, the owner of oil and gas
property, sells it to B, an operator and developer. B, in turn,
secures financing from C, who receives a production payment
for the amount of his advance. In essence, the transaction con-
sists of the sale of A's property to B in return for cash considera-
tion and a retained production payment, with A simultane-
ously assigning the production payment to C in return for the
remainder of the sale price. Before section 636, A was deemed
to have sold his entire interest in which capital gain treatment
was available. C had a depletable in-oil payment right analo-
gous to a royalty right. B, who possesses a working interest
subject to the in-oil payment to C, was also entitled to a deple-
tion allowance.
The aforementioned tax result is changed by section
636(b) which treats the production payment as purchase
money mortgage loan rather than an "economic interest" in the
mineral property. As the purchaser of the working interest, B
production payments on or after August 7, 1969, other than production payments




is now required to treat as depletable income the amounts used
to make the production payment. As the purchaser of the pro-
duction payment, C treats the payments from B as the receipt
of nontaxable return of principal plus taxable interest. As the
seller, A's tax treatment remains unchanged; he realizes a tax-
able gain on the sale.
For example, assume that A sells his property to B for
$100,000 cash plus a $300,000 retained production payment. If
A sells the retained production payment to C for $300,000, A's
gain on the sale is taxable as it was prior to August 7, 1969.
Holding a mineral property with a $400,000 rather than a
$100,000 basis if prior to 1970 basis, B has a higher cost for
purposes of computing cost depletion. However, this advantage
is more than offset by the fact that B may no longer exclude
from gross income the amounts he pays to C in satisfaction of
C's production payment. The reason for this is that C's produc-
tion payment, no longer an economic interest, is deemed to be
a loan. Therefore, B is now taxable on the total production of
the property and is entitled to deduct only that portion to C
which represents payment of interest on the indebtedness.
Obviously, after August 6, 1969, the acquisition of oil prop-
erties by developers by use of an ABC transaction, a common
practice prior to enactment of section 636, has lost much of its
appeal because of the loss of economic interest status for the
retained production. The developer, B, is no longer able to
purchase the mineral property with before-tax dollars.
3. Carved-Out Production Payment
Section 636(a) provides a general rule that a carved-out
mineral production payment, once treated as an economic in-
terest is now to be treated as a mortgage loan on the mineral
property. However, section 636(a) also provides an exception to
this general rule. A production payment carved out for the
"exploration or development of a mineral property"'' 4 is not
treated as a mortgage loan, and is therefore not affected by the
new law, if gross income is not realized by the person creating
the production payment. For example, A carves out a produc-
tion payment for $100,000 at a selling price of $90,000 to X. A
agrees also to use the proceeds to drill development wells on his
mineral property. The exception in section 636(a) applies: X
134. I.R.C. § 636(a).
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can continue to treat the $100,000 production payment as an
economic interest subject to depletion while A does not include
the $90,000 in his income.
The tax treatment of all carved-out production payments
created prior to August 7, 1969 and the treatment of those
carved-out production payments created after August 6, 1969
which do not qualify for the section 636(a) exception, is illus-
trated by the following examples.
Assume that on December 31, 1967, A carves out a
$100,000 production payment bearing interest at 5% of the
productin of his oil property. B purchases the "carve-out" from
A for $95,000. For 1967, A has $95,000 of ordinary income sub-
ject to depletion and B owns a $100,000 production payment.
In 1968, assume A has gross income of $50,000 from the prop-
erty. He excludes $25,000 from his income, paying it to B in
partial satisfaction of the production payment, and claims de-
pletion against the $25,000 he retains. On the other hand, B is
entitled to cost depletion in such an amount that the only net
taxable income he would have to report over the life of the
payment is the interest equivalent which was built into the
production payment.
However, with the enactment of section 636, the treatment
of both A and B has changed. Assume A, the owner of a produc-
ing oil property, carves out a production payment on December
31, 1970, in the principal amount of $100,000 bearing interest
at the rate of 5% per year and payable from 75% of the gross
production. A sells this carve-out to B for $75,000. Since under
section 636(a) A is treated as having obtained a loan, this
transaction creates no taxable income for A in 1970. Because
B is treated as making a loan, the transaction does not create
an economic interest which would allow B to claim depletion.
Assume further that in 1971, the property produces
$100,000 of income from oil. A could have $100,000 of ordinary
income subject to depletion. On December 31, 1971 he pays
$75,000 to B in partial satisfaction of the production payment.
The $75,000 is treated as follows: $5,000 as interest (deductible
as an interest expense to A and includible as interest income
to B); $52,500 as a nontaxable return of capital (75% of the
$75,000 payment to B less $5,000 in interest); and $17,500 as
capital gain to B (not subject to depletion). The principal
amount of the production payment is reduced to $48,500
($100,000 less the $52,500 return of capital).
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C. Depletion- Computation of Allowance
Once it has been ascertained that the taxpayer and his
particular property'3 5 qualify for the depletion allowance, the
computations necessary for the depletion deduction can be
made. The four major considerations inherent in the computa-
tion of the depletion allowance are as follows:
1) Depletion must be computed on a "mineral property by min-
eral property" basis; 13'
2) The Code provides one method for calculating depletion
known as cost depletion;1
3) The Code provides an alternative method, subject to certain
qualifications, for computing depletion known as percentage de-
pletion;lm
4) Both depletion methods must be computed for each property
on an annual basis because the taxpayer is required to use the
higher of the cost of percentage amounts to determine the allowa-
ble depletion deduction.
3'
135. Because depletion must be computed separately for each oil and gas property
owned by the taxpayer (sections 612 and 613), and because the taxpayer cannot com-
pute his allowable depletion deduction until he has determined the number of proper-
ties he holds, (section 614(a)) the importance of the term "property" for depletion
purposes, cannot be overstressed. The following example demonstrates the calculation
of the allowable depletion on a per property basis:
Operating Operating Aggregation
mineral mineral of
interest S interest T S and T
Gross Income $1,000 $1,000 $2,000
Expenses 950 250 1,200
Taxable income
(before depletion) - - -
50 750 800
Depletion:
22% of gross income 220 220 440
50% of net income 25 375 400
Cost (assumed) 50 200 250
Allowable (Greater of
percentage and cost
depletion) 50 230 400
136. I.R.C. §§ 612-13.
137. Id. §§ 611-12.
138. Id. §§ 611, 613, 613A.
139. Id. § 613(a).
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1. Cost Depletion
Because the taxpayer is allowed to recover by way of de-
duction a proportional amount of his capital investment over
the useful life of the asset, the concept of cost depletion can be
likened, in theory, to the straight line method of depreciation.
The main difference, however, between the two concepts rests
in the definition of the asset's "useful life." In the case of depre-
ciable tangible assets, the useful life is measured in years;
whereas, the depletable asset's useful life is measured in terms
of units produced (and sold) and units remaining in reserve.
The discussion of cost depletion will focus on computing cost
depletion, adjusted basis, and number of units remaining in
the oil and gas deposit.
a. The Calculation of Cost Depletion
Cost depletion is the basic method of depletion. The allow-
able cost depletion amount is the product of the "depletion
unit" times the "number of units of mineral sold within the
taxable year."'40 Section 1.611-2(a)(1) of the regulations defines
"depletion unit" as the basis of the mineral property, deter-
mined with reference to section 612 and the regulations
thereunder, divided by the "number of units remaining as of
the taxable year." The regulation defines the "number of units
remaining as of the taxable year" as including those units
which have not yet been recovered, those which have been
recovered but not yet sold, and those which have been re-
covered and sold during the taxable year.' When the regula-
tions are reduced to algorithmic form, the formula for comput-
ing cost depletion can be stated as follows:
Dc = (S) (B) where
(U)
Dc = Cost depletion amount
S = Number of units sold during the taxable year
B = Adjusted basis of property at end of the year
U = Number of units remaining at end of year (includes
units in the reservoir, units recovered but not sold,
and units sold within the taxable year).
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a)(1) (1967).
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a)(3) (1967).
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For example, assume that the oil or gas property has an
adjusted basis of $40,000 as of the end of the taxable year, that
the remaining estimated recoverable units is 30,000 barrels,
and that of the 5,000 barrels produced only 3,000 were sold. The





The starting point in determining adjusted basis is the
taxpayer's initial cost in the acquired property. 4 However,
since the adjusted basis of the property for depletion purposes
is determined at the end of the taxable year, any capital ex-
penditures made during the year are automatically provided
for in the cost depletion computation.
Although the computation of adjusted basis is relatively
simple in most cases, a problem of allocating costs between
depletable and nondepletable property may arise when, with-
out any differentiation, both types are acquired in a single
conveyance. Examples of such a transaction would be the ac-
quisition, for a lump sum, of an oil and gas (depletable) lease-
hold interest along with equipment (depreciably) or the acqui-
sition of a fee interest in surface land (nondepletable) and min-
eral deposit (depletable) without specification of cost break-
down.
In the event that allocation between depletable and non-
depletable property is necessary, sections 1.611-1(d)(4)4 3 and
1.167(a)(5)'4 can be cited for the proposition that the relative
fair market values of the properties should be used in determin-
ing the proper allocation of cost. In this context, although the
acquisition cost of an oil and gas property usually approxi-
mates the fair markets of the assets, it is noteworthy that a
situation can arise wherein the cost and fair market value
amounts differ radically. Such a situation was presented in the
Island Creek Coal Company 5 case. In Island Creek, the peti-
142. I.R.C. §§ 1011-12.
143. (1960).
144. (1956).
145. Island Creek Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 540 (1966).
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tioner acquired coal-bearing property including sales contracts,
depreciable assets, and mineral leases. He contended that the
value of the depreciable assets alone was worth more than the
entire purchase price.'" The Service, however, contended that
the mineral leases represented a part of the cost of the acquired
property."7 On the issue of the valuation of the intangible non-
depreciable assets (mineral leases) the Tax Court held: "We
have also concluded from the evidence that the coal leases had
no cost to petitioner over and above the royalties which were
to be paid to the lessors if, as, and when the coal was mined
and that the sales contracts and other intangible assets had no
value.'" 4 Responding to this adverse decision with Revenue
Ruling 69-539,'" the Service stated, "Only in rare and extraor-
dinary circumstances will a taxpayer acquire a going enterprise
in which the mineral leases have no value apart from the roy-
alty that they specify for the lessor."' 50
What happens when land is acquired with the mineral
lease or estate? The old rule provided that allocation of basis
to the mineral interest was only proper when the property was
in a "proven" area.'5 ' However, the current regulations require
that where surface land is acquired along with a mineral inter-
est in a single transaction, the portion of the cost attributable
to the land, which is nondepletable and nondepreciable, must
be excluded when determining the basis of the mineral inter-
est. 
52
Problems of allocating basis between mineral interests and
surface land acquired in a single transaction can also arise in
gain or loss computations when the property is conveyed in
separate transactions. An illustrative case is American Realty
Company v. Commissioner.'5 3 In this case the taxpayer ac-
quired the surface land and mineral interest in a single transac-
tion. In subsequent years, the taxpayer granted a mineral lease
and claimed percentage depletion on the bonuses received.
146. Id. at 541.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 543.
149. Rev. Rul. 69-539, 1969-2 C.B. 141.
150. Id.
151. XIV-1 C.B. 98 (1935), declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 68-661, 1968-2 C.B. 607.
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-1(b) (1960); see also, Beaver Dam Coal Co. v. United
States, 370 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1967).
153. 47 B.T.A. 653 (1942).
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Upon the sale of the entire surface land and mineral interest,
the taxpayer, claiming that there was no independent mineral
cost at the time of acquisition, did not reduce its basis to reflect
the depletion taken. The Board of Tax Appeals required the
taxpayer to reduce its basis in the property for purposes of
computing gains and losses to reflect the depletion taken in
prior years. 5 ' As a result of this decision, even though no cost
allocation is ever made, a taxpayer who claims depletion de-
ductions will have to reduce his basis in the mineral property
at the time of sale.
c. Number of Units Remaining at the End of the
Taxable Year
While the "number of units sold" during the year, deter-
mined in accordance with the oil and gas taxpayer's method of
accounting, 5 5 presents no unusual problems of interpretation
or application, the "number of units remaining at the end of
the year" presents a more troublesome problem. The problem
arises because the number of units remaining in the oil and gas
reserves is an estimation of the quantity of units contained
within the deposit. The problem is militated by the fact that
the estimated reserves are based not only upon developed de-
posits, but also upon those which are "probable" or even
merely "propective". 56 Due to extensions into known deposits,
where there is a "high degree of probability" or "good evi-
dence" that reserves exist,'57 such "probable" or "prospective"
reserves are estimated in conjunction with the track record of
the larger tract or parcel containing the oil or gas property.",,
Since the estimated reserve figure presupposes
154. Id. at 657.
155. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a)(2) (1960). It provides that the phrase "number of
units sold within the taxable year"-
(i) In the case of a taxpayer reporting income on the cash receipts
and disbursements method, includes units for which payments were re-
ceived within the taxable year although produced or sold prior to the
taxable year, and excludes units sold but not paid for in the taxable year,
and
(ii) In the case of a taxpayer reporting income on the accrual
method, shall be determined from the taxpayer's inventories kept in
physical quantities and in a manner consistent with his method of inven-
tory accounting under section 471 or 472.
156. Treas. Reg. § 1.61102(c)(1)(ii) (1960).
157. Id.
158. Id. § 1.611-2(c)(1)(ii)(a) (1960).
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"recoverable reserves,"' 5 the estimation of reserves also re-
quires a calculation as to that portion of the overall estimated
deposit that will be recoverable. The regulation on this point
states, "[T]he estimate or determination must be made ac-
cording to the method current in the industry and in light of
the most accurate and reliable information obtainable. ' '116
Therefore, it appears that an estimation of recoverable reserves
for oil and gas deposits may also take into account the possibil-
ity of using secondary or tertiary recovery methods.
When must the taxpayer make his estimation on the basis
of such methods? In the leading case on this point, 6' the Tax
Court held that the petitioner's plans for increased recovery by
way of considerable capital expenditure for recovery enhance-
ment was "impractible from a business standpoint.' '6 2 It would
appear that an estimation of recoverable reserves should be
based only upon those reserves which can be recovered from a
feasible economic standpoint. Obviously, the "feasibility" due
to our expanding technology of recovery enhancement for re-
coverable reserves creates a high degree of uncertainty. For
example, whereas "waterflooding" has been used for many
years to stimulate production, more current methods such as
gas recycling, miscible fluid injection, and even "fireloading"
have been gaining favor, although some are still only experi-
mental. Therefore, since extension of the "recoverable re-
serves" doctrine to the more exotic recovery enhancement tech-
niques seems reasonable, fortunately from the taxpayer's view-
point, experimental methods will probably not qualify for esti-
mated recoverable reserve revision purposes.
2. Percentage Depletion
a. Background and History
The percentage depletion allowance, also referred to as
statutory depletion, has been one of the preeminent issues in
the field of oil and gas taxation. Most taxpayers have learned
of the existence of the percentage depletion allowance for oil
and gas and have formed a strong opinion on the subject. As a
result, the percentage depletion allowance is one of the most
159. Id. § 1.611-2(c)(1) (1960).
160. Id.
161. Black Gold Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 241 (1944).
162. Revenue Act of 1916.
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emotional and bitter facets of the "special treatment" tax dis-
pute.
Statutory provision first enacting percentage depletion
can be found in the Revenue Act of 1926. The first specific
statutory reference to oil and gas depletion provided for a
reasonable allowance for actual reduction in the "settled pro-
duction" or regular flow from the well. The "reduction in flow"
concept"4 gave way, in the Revenue Act of 1918, to a "discovery
value depletion" allowance based upon the cost of the property,
or where the fair market value was substantially dispropor-
tionate to the cost, "based upon the fair market value of the
property at the date of discovery, or within thirty days there-
after .... "I The Revenue Act of 192166 left the other discov-
ery value provisions intact but added a clause limiting the
depletion allowance to 50% of the net income from the prop-
erty.
67
Great dissatisfaction was voiced by the oil and gas indus-
try over both the difficulties and uncertainties in establishing
discovery values and the inequalities between competing tax-
payers. 66 The search for a simpler and more operationally uni-
form basis for the depletion allowance led to the "depletion
allowance based on the income" concept codified in the Reve-
nue Act of 1926. While discarding the "discovery value" con-
cept, this act retained the 50% of net income from the property
limitation and provided for a depletion allowance based upon
27 1/2% of the gross income from the property. "9 Although arbi-
trary, the concept of a 27 1/2% depletion rate based on gross
income from the property provided the necessary uniformity
while retaining the discovery and development incentive fac-
164. The reduction in flow method of computing depletion was based on measur-
ing the rate of flow at the time it became regular, or "settled", and then again at the
end of the taxable year. Any reduction in the rate of flow was reduced to a ratio which
was applied against, and ultimately limited to, the capital investment in the well to
yield the allowable depletion deduction from income.
165. Revenue Act of 1918, §§ 214(a)(10), 234(a)(9), (Individuals and corporations
respectively).
166. Revenue Act of 1921, §§ 214(a)(10), 234(a)(9), ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227. (Individ-
uals and corporations respectively).
167. This same limitation is located at § 613(a).
168. Although the 1921 Act solved the problem of the taxpayer taking a larger
depletion deduction than the net income from his property, a very broad discretion still
remained in the taxpayer with a newly discovered oil and gas property.
169. Revenue Act of 1926, § 204(c)(2), ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9.
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tors, and ease of administration lacking in the "discovery
value" method.
The evolution of the current version of the percentage de-
pletion allowance involved many refinements and clarifications
upon the original provisions. It was recognized early that only
those taxpayers qualifying for cost depletion could qualify for
percentage depletion. In 1945 the court in the case of Kirby
Petroleum Company v. Commissioner held as follows: "The
allowance of percentage depletion is made only to the persons
who would be entitled to claim cost'depletion on account of
their ownership of a depletable capital asset, the fundamental
theory of the allowance not having been altered by the provi-
sions for percentage depletion."'' 0 Further, although the Ser-
vice tried to limit allowance of percentage depletion to only
those taxpayers who have a positive basis for their economic
interest, the courts consistently ruled as follows:
The percentage depletion allowance is not conditioned upon the
existence of any basis, and bears no relation thereto. Under the
plain terms of the statute, it is allowable to any taxpayer who
owns an economic interest in oil or gas in place and derives in-
come therefrom during the taxable year.'71
Also, disputes arose over the proper allocation of depletion
and gross income between taxpayers because the percentage
depletion allowance was linked directly to income from produc-
tion. Numerous clarifications concerning proper allocation of
percentage depletion between economic interest holders were
made in the Twin Bell Oil Syndicate case.7 2 The holding in
Twin Bell was based on the following train of logic: no matter
which method of computing depletion is used, the total allowa-
ble deduction must be apportioned between the lessor and les-
see.7 3 To allow a 1 royalty holder and the taxpayer, both of
whom receive gross income for the property, to take depletion
on their gross income would result in a total allowance of 271/2 %
of 5/4 of the total production which is inconsistent with the
principal of apportionment between lessor and lessee. The
Court noted further that the concept of "gross income from the
property" as a basis for computing percentage depletion could
not be interpreted to include all uses possible, but only the
170. 148 F.2d 80, 81 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd. 326 U.S. 599 (1946).
171. Rowan Drilling Co. v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 62, 66 (5th Cir. 1942).
172. Commissioner v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U.S. 312 (1934).
173. Id. at 320.
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gross income from oil and gas. "4 By restricting the concept of
allowable depletion to a single depletion allowance among eco-
nomic interest holders, the royalty holder was entitled to per-
centage depletion on his gross income from the royalty, and the
taxpayer was limited to percentage depletion calculated on the
portion of his gross income from the property he had the right
to retain. 7 '
The importance of the percentage depletion allowance is
due largely to the results of the interplay between percentage
depletion and other oil and gas provisions, such as the IDC
election and the mandatory capitalization of G and G costs.
For example, a taxpayer claiming percentage depletion who
opts to deduct intangible drilling costs, can achieve a greater
total deduction than if the IDC are capitalized, even though
the IDC must be included in the expenses offsetting gross
income to reach the net income figure for purposes of the 50%
net income limitation. "'
The following example illustrates the computations in-




Total Expense $ 50,000
Net Income $ 50,000
50% of Net Income $ 25,000
22% of Gross Income $ 22,000
Allowable Depletion $ 22,000
IDC Deduction $ 30,000
Total Deductions $52,000
b. Recent Legislative Enactments
The creation of the percentage depletion allowance
spawned an argument that has flourished for more than fifty
years. While terming the percentage depletion provisions as
"special treatment," many taxpayers and legislators have at-
174. Id. at 321.
175. Id.
176. Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5.
177. The assumptions are: 1) the taxpayer elects to deduct IDC currently under
§ 263(c); and 2) taxpayer has one property as defined by § 614(a).
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tacked the percentage depletion allowance on the grounds that
it provides unwarranted and preferential tax benefits for a sin-
gle industry and group of elite taxpayers. In rebuttal, oil and
gas taxpayers, citing the importance of domestic energy suffi-
ciency, have argued that, in the face of extreme economic risk
and the requisite large capital investment, the loss of percen-
tage depletion would reduce the incentive to discover and de-
velop new oil and gas deposits. For many years the oil and gas
industry was able to maintain the upper hand in Congress.
Recently, however, the industry suffered a resounding defeat.
By enacting the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Tax Reduction
Act of 1975, Congress acknowledged the political influence of
reform-minded taxpayers.
While the Tax Reform Act of 1969171 repealed the 271/2%
depletion rate and instituted a new flat rate of 22% of gross
income from the property, the Tax Reduction Act of 1975'1'
effectively repealed the section 613 percentage depletion allow-
ance provisions for all except four limited groups of taxpay-
ers.1ss The 22% depletion allowance is now granted only to tax-
payers with income from production of the following: 1) regu-
lated natural gas;'"' 2) natural gas sold under a fixed con-
tract;18 2 and 3) any geothermal deposit which is determined to
be a gas well.IS3 The fourth group of taxpayers still allowed to
178. § 501, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
179. § 501, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 47 (1975).
180. I.R.C. § 613A(b)(1).
181. Section 613A(b)(2)(B) defines regulated natural gas as:
domestic natural gas produced and sold by the producer, before July 1,
1976, subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission, the
price for which has not been adjusted to reflect to any extent the increase
in liability of the seller for tax under this chapter by reason of the repeal
of percentage depletion for gas. Price increases after February 1, 1975,
shall be presumed to take increases in tax liabilities into account unless
the taxpayer demonstrates the contrary by clear and convincing evi-
dence.
182. Section 613A(b)(2)(a) defines natural gas sold under a fixed contract as the
following:
domestic natural gas sold by the producer under a contract in effect on
February 1, 1975, and at all times thereafter, before such sale, under
which the price for such gas cannot be adjusted to reflect to any extent
the increase in liabilities of the seller for tax under this chapter by reason
of the repeal of percentage depletion for gas. Price increases after Febru-
ary 1, 1975, shall be presumed to take increases in tax liabilities into
account unless the taxpayer demonstrates to the contrary by clear and
convincing evidence.
183. Geothermal deposit is not defined in section 613A. Section 1.613A-7(e), of the
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take percentage depletion are those "independent producers
and royalty owners" who qualify under paragraphs 613A(c)(1)
through (11) as limited by paragraphs 613A(d)(1) through (4).
However, these independent producers and royalty owners are
further restricted in claiming percentage depletion. Not only
are they subject to a new limitation based on taxable income,'8
independent producers and royalty owners are also limited to
a sliding scale in future years on both the applicable percen-
tage'" and the quantity of production."6 In addition, depletion
is a tax preference item for minimum tax purposes." 7 The ex-
emption afforded the independent producers and royalty own-
ers with their correlative restrictions deserve further analysis.
i. Qualification as Independent Producers on Royalty Own-
ers
Known also as the "small producers" exemption, the inde-
pendent producers and royalty owners exemption in section
613A(c) is most easily defined by exclusion. Oil and gas taxpay-
ers who are "retailers," "refiners," or are "related" to retailers
or refiners cannot qualify under the section 613A(c) exemption.
A "retailer" is any taxpayer who sells oil or natural gas,
or any product derived therefrom, directly or through a
"related person", either 1) through any retail outlet operated
by the taxpayer or a "related person", or 2) to any person who
is: a) obligated to use a taxpayer's or a related person's trade-
mark or service name in marketing or distributing the oil or
natural gas product, or b) given authority by the taxpayer or a
related person to occupy any retail outlet which is owned,
leased, or otherwise controlled by the taxpayer or a related
person.'
A "refiner" is a taxpayer or related person who refines
crude oil and on any single day during the year refines more
than 50,000 barrels. 89
For purposes of both the retailer and refiner exclusions, a
proposed regulations defines it in terms of a geothermal reservoir of heat, stored in
rocks or aqueous fluid, in the form of liquid or vapor.
184. See text accompanying note 217 infra.
185. See note 203 infra.
186. See note 199 infra.
187. See text accompanying note 221 infra.
188. I.R.C. § 613A(d)(2).
189. Id. § 613A(d)(4).
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related person exists whenever 1) the taxpayer or another per-
son holds a significant ownership interest in the other, or 2) a
third person has significant ownership interest in both the tax-
payer and such other person."10 A significant ownership interest
is deemed to exist where the taxpayer, other person, or third
person, owns 5% or more of either 1) the value of the outstand-
ing stock of a corporation, 2) the profits or capital of a partner-
ship, or 3) the beneficial interest in an estate or trust.'
Although the statutory provisions in the 1975 Act exclud-
ing retailers, refiners, and related persons were very compre-
hensive and detailed, it is clear that, in many situations ambi-
guities can arise over the proper interpretation of the provi-
sions. For example, in an explanation of the Act it was stated:
[Tihe retailer exclusion could have been interpreted to deny the
small producer exemption to a royalty interest holder who also
holds a mere 5 percent interest in a partnership that operates a
comer drugstore which sells petroleum jelly. The Congress be-
lieves that the retailer exclusion should apply only where the
taxpayer has substantial retail operations and not to cases where
a taxpayers retail operations are essentially de minimus.1'2
Assuming the taxpayer does not run afoul of the retailer
and refiner exclusions, he faces two more obstacles before he
may begin to compute his percentage depletion allowance.
These obstacles are the advance royalty rule and the transfer
rule. Because the percentage depletion allowance for small
producers is allowed only where there is actual production dur-
ing the year, under section 1.613A-7(f) of the proposed regula-
tions advanced royalties and lease bonuses no longer qualify for
percentage to the extent actual production during the taxable
year is insufficient to earn such royalties."13 As the second ob-
stacle, transfer of "proven" oil and gas property to an otherwise
small producer transferee precludes the transferee from qualifi-
cation under the section 613A(c) exemption to take percentage
depletion on income attributable to that property. "' Also, pro-
duction from that property cannot be taken into account in any
computation.
190. Id. § 613A(d)(3).
191. Id.
192. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 94th Cong., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM AcT OF 1976 (CCH) 625 (1976).
193. 42 Fed. Reg. 24, 279, 24,287 (1977).
194. I.R.C. § 613A(c)(9).
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ii. Restriction on the Quantity Subject to Percentage Deple-
tion
The smallproducer exemption allows the taxpayer to com-
pute his percentage allowance only upon his "average daily
production" of oil or natural gas"5 as limited by his "depletable
oil quantity" or his "depletable natural gas quantity."'
'96
The Code provides that taxpayers "average daily produc-
tion" for the taxable year is determined by:
dividing his aggregate production of domestic crude oil or natural
gas, as the case may be, during the taxable year by the number
of days in such taxable year, and (B) in the case of a taxpayer
holding a partial interest in the production from any property
(including an interest held in partnership) such taxpayer's pro-
duction shall be considered to be that amount of such production
determined by multiplying the total production of such property
by the taxpayer's percentage depletion participation in the reve-
nues from such property.'T
The aggregate production used in the above computation does
not take into account any production resulting from secondary
or tertiary process.""8 Interestingly, the average daily produc-
tion determination is made on a per-taxpayer basis rather than
a per-property basis.
The taxpayer's depletable oil quantity, which limits the
average daily production, is equal to the tentative "phase-out
table" amount.9 9 This amount is reduced, but not below zero,
by the taxpayer's average daily secondary or tertiary produc-
tion for the taxable year.2 "0
The taxpayer's depletable natural gas quantity is an
195. Id. § 613A(c)(1)(A).
196. Id. § 613A(c)(1)(B).
197. Id. § 613A(c)(2).
198. Id. § 613A(c)(2)(B).
199. Id. § 613A(c)(3)(B). The table is reproduced below:
In the case of production The tentative quantity






1980 and thereafter 1,000
200, Id. § 613A(c)(3)(A)(i), (ii).
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amount equal to his phase-out table barrel amount multiplied
by 6,000 cubic feet." ' Thus, if he elected to apply his total
tentative quantity to natural gas, a taxpayer in 1980 would
have a tentative depletable natural gas quantity amount of
6,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas.
Because the section 613A(c)(3)(B) tentative depletable oil
quantity is reduced by the taxpayer's average daily secondary
or tertiary production for the taxable year, percentage deple-
tion computations must be made separately for the taxpayer's
primary and secondary production attributable income. On
this point, section 613A(c)(6) provides that the amount of sec-
ondary or tertiary production (computed on an average daily
basis for the taxable year) that does not exceed the taxpayer's
tentative depletable oil quantity or depletable natural gas
quantity, is entitled to the 22% rate of depletion 20 2 notwith-
standing the sliding scale applicable percentage rates listed in
subparagraph 5.203 Section 1.613A-7(k) of the proposed regula-
tions"I defines secondary and tertiary production in terms of
increased production of oil or gas from a domestic well follow-
ing application of a secondary process. "Increased production"
is that marginal increase in actual production during the year
over that which would have been produced absent application
of the "secondary process," and is manifested by an increase
in either the rate or duration of recovery.2 5 A "secondary pro-
cess" is a process in which liquids or gases are injected in the
201. Id. § 613A(c)(4).
202. See note 199 supra.
203. I.R.C. § 613A(c)(5). The applicable percentage table is reproduced below:
In the case of production The applicable










1984 and after 15




deposit to increase the internal pressure in order to enhance
recovery o6
One major exception to the secondary process provisions
involves any process which must be introduced early in the
productive life of the property in order to be reasonably effec-
tive . ' 7 Cycling of gas in a gas condensate well is specifically
excluded from secondary process status."8 But injection or fire-
flooding will not be so disqualified if they would still have been
reasonably effective had they been introduced later in the pro-
duction life of the property.
2
0
It should be noted that the apparent benefit of retention
of the 22% rate for secondary or tertiary production until 1981
may be disadvantageous to taxpayers whose production ex-
ceeds the quantity limitations.2 10 Since secondary and tertiary
processes are very expensive and such expenses are subtracted
from gross income for the net income percentage limitation, the
taxpayer who is required to use all his depletable oil and natu-
ral gas quantity for such secondary or tertiary production may
have any benefit realized from the 22% rate retention offset by
the lower allowable deduction due to the net income limitation.
Those small producer taxpayers whose average daily pro-
duction exceeds the quantity limitations must look to special
rules for guidance. Excess production of both oil"' and natural
gas212 requires the taxpayer to compute his allowable depletion
for each property as follows:
1) Divide the applicable depletable oil or natural gas quantity
by the average daily production in barrels or mcf for the taxable
year.
2) Compute the total percentage depletion allowance which
would have been allowable for the property using the applicable
sliding scale percentage rate for the property.
3) Multiply the amounts calculated in 1) and 2) to yield the
allowable percentage deduction for the property.
2 13





210. See note 203 supra.
211. I.R.C. § 613A(c)(S)(A).
212. Id. § 613A(c)(8)(B), (C).
213. Id. § 613A(c)(7).
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centage rate to be applied against gross income may differ. The
taxpayer taking depletion upon regulated natural gas, fixed
contrast natural gas, or geothermal deposits, is allowed a flat
22%111 rate until 1984.15 On the other hand, the small producer
must look to the applicable percentage table .
2 1
iii. The Limitation Based on Taxable Income
Section 613A(d)(1) created a new 65% limitation based on
the taxpayer's taxable income. The purpose of the limitation
is to further restrict the allowable percentage depletion deduc-
tion for the small producer. The 65% limitation is applied to
taxable income computed without regard to any depletion on
production which is subject to the small producer exemption
rules, any net operating loss carryback, any capital loss carry-
back, and certain distributions from a trust to its beneficiary."1 7
Any amount of deduction which is disallowed for the current
taxable year can be carried forward over to the next taxable
year,"' in which case such amount must be allocated back
among the respective properties owned for purposes of deter-
mining the higher of cost or percentage depletion."'9
The 65% limitation does not replace the section 613(a) 50%
of taxable income limitation. The distinction between the 65%
and 50% limitations is that they apply to taxable income on a
per-taxpayer basis and per-property basis respectively. The
result is that the small producer taxpayer must apply both
limitations in his computations of allowable percentage deple-
tion deduction. Because of the per-taxpayer and per-property
difference, the provision for carry-over of the amount of percen-
tage depletion disallowed by virtue of the 65% limitation, cre-
ates horrendous problems of computational complexity when
combined with the 50% limitation and higher-of-cost or percen-
tage provisions.12
iv. Depletion as a Tax Preference Item
The small producer faces yet another computation which
214. Id. § 613A(c)(6)(A)(ii).
215. Id. § 613A(c)(6)(C).
216. See note 203 supra.
217. I.R.C. § 613A(d)(1),
218. Id.
219. For a detailed discussion of this problem, see Burke, Jr., Tax Reform Act of
1975 - Two Years Later, TWENTY-EIGHTH OIL AND GAS INST., 611, 611-14, 622-23,
(1977).
220. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
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will impose additional tax liability. Enacted in 1969, section
57(a)(8) lists depletion deducted which is in excess of the ad-
justed basis of the property at the end of the taxable year as a
tax preference item subject to the minimum tax provisions.'
V. A COMPREHENSIVE EXAMPLE
The following example illustrates several computations
required when a small producer endeavors to claim depletion.
Assume that in the taxable year 1981 a taxpayer, W, owns
one property which has both primary and secondary produc-
tion oil income of 255,500 and 109,500 barrels for the year re-
spectively. Gross income of $1,500,000 and expenses of
$1,000,000 are incurred from the producing property. The tax-
payers taxable income is $400,000. Assuming his allowable cost
depletion is $240,000, what is the taxpayer's allowable percen-
tage depletion?
Computation of Depletable Oil Quantity
Average daily primary production $225,500 - 365 700 bbl
Average daily secondary production
$109,500 -- 365 300 bbl
Aggregate average daily production 1,000 bbl
Less number of barrels from secondary production 300 bbl
Depletable oil quantity 700 bbl
Apportionment of Gross and Taxable Income to Primary
and Secondary Production
Gross Income
Primary 700 bbl X $1,500,000 - $1,050,000
Secondary 300 bbl X $1,500,000 $ 450,000
Taxable Income
Primary 700 bbl X $400,000 $350,000
Secondary 300 bbl X $500,000 $150,000
Computation of Tentative Percentage Depletion
Primary Secondary
Gross Income $1,050,000 $450,000
Taxable Income 350,000 150,000
221. The 20% is applied against primary production while 22% is applied against
secondary production. See note 203 supra.
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20/22% of Gross Income 210,000 99,000
50% of Taxable Income Limitation 175,000 75,000
Amount Allowable 175,000 75,000
Computation of Total Percentage Depletion Allowable
Combined primary and secondary depletion $250,000
The 65% limitation: 65% x 400,000 $260,000
Lesser of the two $250,000
Since the percentage depletion is higher than cost deple-
tion on the property, the taxpayer will deduct $250,000 as per-
centage depletion.
VI. CONCLUSION
As witnessed by the favorable percentage depletion and
intangible drilling cost provisions in the Internal Revenue
Code, there has been, and at present there still is, a national
policy favoring the exploration for and exploitation of domestic
oil and gas reserves. However, juxtaposed to the longstanding
preferential Code provisions reflecting this policy favoring oil
and gas exploration and exploitation are the newly enacted
provisions, added in recent years in response to taxpayer criti-
cism and "tax reform" demands.
It has been readily apparent that the aforementioned
"reform" legislations have served to greatly reduce the incen-
tives and preferential tax treatment previously afforded the oil
and gas industry. Although these "reforms" have not been ex-
clusively restrictive, as this article has pointed out, the bulk of
the new provisions limit potential benefits, while the remain-
der are rather neutral in effect.

